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Models:

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Planter Security Barrier System
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Magnum FP
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Bollard Cover
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Conventional Planters
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Active Barrier Sources

 


Site Security Checklists
(EXCERPTED FROM MILITARY FM5-114)

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Exterior-Attack Checklist

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Standoff-Weapons-Attack Checklist

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Ballistic-Attack Checklist

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Forced-Entry-Attack Checklist

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Cover-Entry-and Insider-Compromise-Attack Checklist

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Electronic-and Acoustical-Eavesdropping Checklist

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Visual-Surveillance Checklist

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Mail-Bomb-Tactic Checklist

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Supply–Bomb–Tactic Checklist

Minimum–Measures Checklist

Basic considerations—

bulletEliminate potential hiding places near facilities.
bulletProvide an unobstructed view around all facilities.
bulletSite facilities within view of other occupied facilities.
bulletLocate assets stored on–site but outside facilities within view of occupied rooms of the facilities.
bulletMinimize the need for signs or other indications of asset locations.
bulletMinimize exterior signs that may indicate location of assets.
bulletProvide a 170–foot minimum facility separation from installation boundaries.
bulletEliminate lines of approach perpendicular to buildings.
bulletMinimize vehicle and personnel access points.
bulletEliminate parking beneath facilities.
bulletLocate parking as far from facilities as practical.
bulletIlluminate building exteriors or exterior sites where assets are located.
bulletSecure access to power and/or heat plants, gas mains, water supplies, and electrical service.
bulletLocate public parking areas within view of occupied rooms or facilities.
bulletLocate construction staging areas away from asset locations.
bulletLocate facilities away from natural or man–made vantage points.
bulletLocate facilities’ critical assets within areas that do not have exterior walls, when possible.
bulletMinimize window area.
bulletCover windows next to doors so that aggressors cannot unlock the doors through them.
bulletSecure exposed exterior ladders and fire escapes.
bulletDesign building layout so that there are no areas hidden from view from control points or occupied spaces.
bulletArrange building interiors to eliminate hiding places.
bulletLocate assets in spaces occupied 24 hours a day, when possible.
bulletLocate activities with large visitor populations away from protected assets when possible.
bulletLocate protected assets in controlled areas where they are visible to more than one person.
bulletPlace mail rooms on the perimeter of facilities.
bulletProvide emergency backup power generation for critical activities/facilities.

Exterior-Attack Checklist

In addition to the Minimum-Level Measures, consider the following measures to counter an exterior attack of a facility or installation:

Site Design

bulletProvide a 50–foot standoff zone around facilities.
bulletProvide a 30–foot clear zone around facilities.
bulletProvide a 7–foot perimeter fence around installations.
bulletProvide trees and tall shrubs to resist thrown objects.
bulletDo not place trash receptacles within clear zone.
bulletProvide entry control point at perimeter gates in fences.

Standoff-Weapons-Attack Checklist

In addition to the Minimum-Level Measures, consider the following measures to counter a standoff weapons attack:

Site Design

bulletSite facilities on high points of ground, when possible.
bulletBlock direct lines of sight to sensitive areas of the facilities using one or more of the following:
bulletOther facilities housing less critical assets.
bulletDense plantings of trees or shrubs.
bulletObscuration fences.
bulletWalls.
bulletEarth berms.
bulletProvide pre-detonation screens surrounding facilities (see Figure A-14). A pre-detonation screen may have several effects. Preferably it will damage the fuse on an antitank rocket, "dudding" the rocket (any structure behind the fence must still defeat the kinetic energy of the round). The second possible effect of the screen is to detonate an antitank rocket if it strikes the screen. In this case, the combination of standoff distance and the construction of the protected facility must defeat the gas jet from the shaped charge. In some cases, a pre-detonation screen may have no effect on an antitank rocket.

Building Utilization

bulletHouse critical assets away from the exterior of facilities.
bulletProvide an 8–foot-wide area (minimum) within the facilities (around the facilities’ perimeter) that houses only non-critical assets.
bulletPlace assets in protective areas below grade or underground.
bulletProvide entry foyers.
bulletArrange furniture so that people are out of sight of windows.
bulletMinimize exterior access by blocking some of the existing doors.

Ballistic-Attack Checklist

In addition to the Minimum-Level Measures, consider the following measures to counter a ballistic attack:

Site Design

bulletSite facilities on high points of ground, when possible.
bulletBlock direct sight line to sensitive areas of the facilities using one or more of the following:
bulletOther facilities housing less critical assets.
bulletDense plantings of trees or shrubs.
bulletObscuration fences.
bulletWalls.
bulletEarth berms.

Building Utilization

bulletHouse facilities’ critical assets within areas that do not have exterior walls when possible.
bulletArrange entryways to eliminate sight lines.
bulletArrange furniture so no personnel are within sight line of windows.
bulletProvide drapes or window shades to use at night.
bulletProvide fragment-retention film on glass windows and skylights.
bulletCover skylights where there are potential sight lines through the roof.

Forced-Entry-Attack Checklist

In addition to the Minimum-Level Measures, consider the following measures to counter a forced-entry attack:

Site Design

bulletProvide unobstructed view around facilities.
bulletSite facilities away from installation boundaries and areas open to the public.
bulletSite facilities within view of other occupied facilities.
bulletLocate assets stored on–site but outside the facilities within view of occupied rooms in the facilities.
bulletUse screens or vegetation to conceal assets located on-site but outside of any facilities.
bulletDenote boundaries with fences or freestanding walls.
bulletConceal and lock access ports to utilities.
bulletIlluminate building exterior or exterior sites where assets are located.
bulletMinimize shrubbery or other landscaping higher than 1 foot above finished floor .- —height of buildings.

Building Utilization

bulletLocate protected assets as far from exterior walls as possible.
bulletCluster assets to minimize the number of hardened spaces within facilities, or
bulletDistribute assets in large facilities to increase the difficulty of access, or
bulletLocate assets in basement spaces or underground facilities.
bulletPlan alternate locations for assets to allow the change of location periodically or during higher threat conditions.
bulletLocate assets above, below, or oblique to sight lines.
bulletDesign building layout so that there are no areas hidden from view from control points or occupied spaces.
bulletArrange building interiors to eliminate hiding places.
bulletLocate assets in spaces occupied 24 hours a day, when possible.
bulletProvide temporary sites for assets that may be threatened during higher threat conditions in spaces occupied 24 hours a day.
bulletLay out buildings to conceal assets and make access difficult for intruders.
bulletDo not expose a buildings’ structure or otherwise advertise the nature of the facilities’ construction.
bulletSecure skylights.
bulletSecure roof access hatches.
bulletEliminate exterior access to roofs, where possible.
bulletSecure exposed exterior ladders and fire escapes.

Cover-Entry-and Insider-Compromise-Attack Checklist

In addition to the Minimum-Level Measures, consider the following measures to counter covert entry and insider aggression. This list does not include the many options available to detect unauthorized activity or to control access.

bulletLocate activities with large visitor populations away from protected assets.
bulletLocate protected assets in common areas where they are visible to more than one person.
bulletMinimize the number of entrances into protected areas.
bulletPlace protected assets in restricted areas to which access is limited to authorized personnel or escorted visitors.
bulletCompartmentalize protected assets within restricted areas to limit access among authorized personnel.
bulletEstablish access control points outside of controlled areas to search personnel and carry–in items.
bulletProvide metal or metal-clad doors and metal frames on exterior walls of access control points.
bulletProvide blast-resistant doors between access control points and protected areas.

Electronic-and Acoustical-Eavesdropping Checklist

In addition to the Minimum-Level Measures, consider the following measures to counter eavesdropping:

Site Design

bulletEliminate hiding places near the facilities from which aggressors can eavesdrop.
bulletControl access to exterior areas around the building.
bulletControl access to utility openings.
bulletLocate protected assets in buildings away from installation boundaries.

Building Utilization

bulletLocate protected assets away from the exterior of buildings and away from interior, uncontrolled areas.
bulletSurround protected areas with controlled–access rooms that house non-critical assets.
bulletDo not allow operable windows in protected areas.
bulletAccount for all telephone and other cables.
bulletDisconnect and remove unused cables.
bulletDo not use intercom systems.

Visual-Surveillance Checklist

In addition to the Minimum-Level Measures, consider the following measures to counter visual surveillance:

Site Design

bulletSite facilities on a high point of land, when possible.
bulletObscure assets from sight lines; use one or more the following methods:
bulletScreen critical assets with facilities housing less critical assets.
bulletUse visual barriers to block views of the asset (dense plantings of trees or shrubs, decorative wal1s or fences, earth berms, or obscuration fences.

Mail-Bomb-Tactic Checklist

In addition to the Minimum-Level Measures, consider the the following measures to counter a mail–bomb threat (measures for detecting bombs are not included):

Building Utilization

bulletLocate mail rooms away from main facility entrances, areas of high density population, and critical assets.
bulletProvide a bomb-disposal container in the mail room.
bulletPlace mail rooms on the perimeter of facilities, or
bulletUse a central mail–handling facility that is separate from protected facilities.

Supply–Bomb–Tactic Checklist

In addition to the Minimum-Level Measures, consider the following measures to counter a supply-bomb threat (measures for detecting bombs or explosives are not included):

Site Design

bulletPark vehicles away from loading dock areas.
bulletSite facilities so that loading dock areas are away from other facilities or high density population areas.
bulletSite facilities as far from other facilities as possible.

Building Utilization

bulletPlace supplies so they are at least 8 feet from facility walls to provide a standoff distance between bombs and walls.
bulletPlace receiving areas away from facility entrances.
bulletLocate assets away from receiving areas.
bulletProvide a separate facility for handling and receiving supplies.

 

 

 

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