Accessories
Models:
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Site Security Checklists
(EXCERPTED FROM MILITARY FM5-114)
Minimum–Measures
Checklist
Basic considerations—
 | Eliminate potential hiding places near facilities. |
| Provide an unobstructed view around all facilities. |
| Site facilities within view of other occupied facilities. |
| Locate assets stored on–site but outside facilities
within view of occupied rooms of the facilities. |
| Minimize the need for signs or other indications of asset
locations. |
| Minimize exterior signs that may indicate location of
assets. |
| Provide a 170–foot minimum facility separation from
installation boundaries. |
| Eliminate lines of approach perpendicular to buildings. |
| Minimize vehicle and personnel access points. |
| Eliminate parking beneath facilities. |
| Locate parking as far from facilities as practical. |
| Illuminate building exteriors or exterior sites where
assets are located. |
| Secure access to power and/or heat plants, gas mains, water
supplies, and electrical service. |
| Locate public parking areas within view of occupied rooms
or facilities. |
| Locate construction staging areas away from asset
locations. |
| Locate facilities away from natural or man–made vantage
points. |
| Locate facilities’ critical assets within areas that do
not have exterior walls, when possible. |
| Minimize window area. |
| Cover windows next to doors so that aggressors cannot
unlock the doors through them. |
| Secure exposed exterior ladders and fire escapes. |
| Design building layout so that there are no areas hidden
from view from control points or occupied spaces. |
| Arrange building interiors to eliminate hiding places. |
| Locate assets in spaces occupied 24 hours a day, when
possible. |
| Locate activities with large visitor populations away from
protected assets when possible. |
| Locate protected assets in controlled areas where they are
visible to more than one person. |
| Place mail rooms on the perimeter of facilities. |
| Provide emergency backup power generation for critical
activities/facilities. |
Exterior-Attack Checklist
In addition to the Minimum-Level Measures, consider the
following measures to counter an exterior attack of a facility or installation:
Site Design
| Provide a 50–foot standoff zone around facilities. |
| Provide a 30–foot clear zone around facilities. |
| Provide a 7–foot perimeter fence around installations. |
| Provide trees and tall shrubs to resist thrown objects. |
| Do not place trash receptacles within clear zone. |
| Provide entry control point at perimeter gates in fences. |
Standoff-Weapons-Attack Checklist
In addition to the Minimum-Level
Measures, consider the following measures to counter a
standoff weapons attack:
Site Design
| Site facilities on high points of ground, when possible. |
| Block direct lines of sight to sensitive areas of the
facilities using one or more of the following:
 | Other facilities housing less critical assets. |
| Dense plantings of trees or shrubs. |
| Obscuration fences. |
| Walls. |
| Earth berms. |
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| Provide pre-detonation screens surrounding facilities (see
Figure A-14). A pre-detonation screen may have several effects. Preferably
it will damage the fuse on an antitank rocket, "dudding" the
rocket (any structure behind the fence must still defeat the kinetic energy
of the round). The second possible effect of the screen is to detonate an
antitank rocket if it strikes the screen. In this case, the combination of
standoff distance and the construction of the protected facility must defeat
the gas jet from the shaped charge. In some cases, a pre-detonation screen
may have no effect on an antitank rocket. |
Building Utilization
| House critical assets away from the exterior of facilities. |
| Provide an 8–foot-wide area (minimum) within the
facilities (around the facilities’ perimeter) that houses only
non-critical assets. |
| Place assets in protective areas below grade or
underground. |
| Provide entry foyers. |
| Arrange furniture so that people are out of sight of
windows. |
| Minimize exterior access by blocking some of the existing
doors. |
Ballistic-Attack Checklist
In addition to the Minimum-Level
Measures, consider the following measures to counter a
ballistic attack:
Site Design
| Site facilities on high points of ground, when possible. |
| Block direct sight line to sensitive areas of the
facilities using one or more of the following:
| Other facilities housing less critical assets. |
| Dense plantings of trees or shrubs. |
| Obscuration fences. |
| Walls. |
| Earth berms. |
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Building Utilization
| House facilities’ critical assets within areas that do
not have exterior walls when possible. |
| Arrange entryways to eliminate sight lines. |
| Arrange furniture so no personnel are within sight line of
windows. |
| Provide drapes or window shades to use at night. |
| Provide fragment-retention film on glass windows and
skylights. |
| Cover skylights where there are potential sight lines
through the roof. |
Forced-Entry-Attack Checklist
In addition to the Minimum-Level
Measures, consider the following measures to counter a
forced-entry attack:
Site Design
| Provide unobstructed view around facilities. |
| Site facilities away from installation boundaries and areas
open to the public. |
| Site facilities within view of other occupied facilities. |
| Locate assets stored on–site but outside the facilities
within view of occupied rooms in the facilities. |
| Use screens or vegetation to conceal assets located on-site
but outside of any facilities. |
| Denote boundaries with fences or freestanding walls. |
| Conceal and lock access ports to utilities. |
| Illuminate building exterior or exterior sites where assets
are located. |
| Minimize shrubbery or other landscaping higher than 1 foot
above finished floor .- —height of buildings. |
Building Utilization
| Locate protected assets as far from exterior walls as
possible. |
| Cluster assets to minimize the number of hardened spaces
within facilities, or |
| Distribute assets in large facilities to increase the
difficulty of access, or |
| Locate assets in basement spaces or underground facilities. |
| Plan alternate locations for assets to allow the change of
location periodically or during higher threat conditions. |
| Locate assets above, below, or oblique to sight lines. |
| Design building layout so that there are no areas hidden
from view from control points or occupied spaces. |
| Arrange building interiors to eliminate hiding places. |
| Locate assets in spaces occupied 24 hours a day, when
possible. |
| Provide temporary sites for assets that may be threatened
during higher threat conditions in spaces occupied 24 hours a day. |
| Lay out buildings to conceal assets and make access
difficult for intruders. |
| Do not expose a buildings’ structure or otherwise
advertise the nature of the facilities’ construction. |
| Secure skylights. |
| Secure roof access hatches. |
| Eliminate exterior access to roofs, where possible. |
| Secure exposed exterior ladders and fire escapes. |
Cover-Entry-and Insider-Compromise-Attack Checklist
In addition to the Minimum-Level
Measures, consider the following measures to counter covert
entry and insider aggression. This list does not include the many options
available to detect unauthorized activity or to control access.
| Locate activities with large visitor populations away from
protected assets. |
| Locate protected assets in common areas where they are
visible to more than one person. |
| Minimize the number of entrances into protected areas. |
| Place protected assets in restricted areas to which access
is limited to authorized personnel or escorted visitors. |
| Compartmentalize protected assets within restricted areas
to limit access among authorized personnel. |
| Establish access control points outside of controlled areas
to search personnel and carry–in items. |
| Provide metal or metal-clad doors and metal frames on
exterior walls of access control points. |
| Provide blast-resistant doors between access control points
and protected areas. |
Electronic-and Acoustical-Eavesdropping Checklist
In addition to the Minimum-Level
Measures, consider the following measures to counter
eavesdropping:
Site Design
| Eliminate hiding places near the facilities from which
aggressors can eavesdrop. |
| Control access to exterior areas around the building. |
| Control access to utility openings. |
| Locate protected assets in buildings away from installation
boundaries. |
Building Utilization
| Locate protected assets away from the exterior of buildings
and away from interior, uncontrolled areas. |
| Surround protected areas with controlled–access rooms
that house non-critical assets. |
| Do not allow operable windows in protected areas. |
| Account for all telephone and other cables. |
| Disconnect and remove unused cables. |
| Do not use intercom systems. |
Visual-Surveillance Checklist
In addition to the Minimum-Level
Measures, consider the following measures to counter visual
surveillance:
Site Design
| Site facilities on a high point of land, when possible. |
| Obscure assets from sight lines; use one or more the
following methods:
| Screen critical assets with facilities housing less
critical assets. |
| Use visual barriers to block views of the asset (dense
plantings of trees or shrubs, decorative wal1s or fences, earth berms,
or obscuration fences. |
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Mail-Bomb-Tactic Checklist
In addition to the Minimum-Level
Measures, consider the the following measures to counter a
mail–bomb threat (measures for detecting bombs are not included):
Building Utilization
| Locate mail rooms away from main facility entrances, areas
of high density population, and critical assets. |
| Provide a bomb-disposal container in the mail room. |
| Place mail rooms on the perimeter of facilities, or |
| Use a central mail–handling facility that is separate
from protected facilities. |
Supply–Bomb–Tactic Checklist
In addition to the Minimum-Level
Measures, consider the following measures to counter a
supply-bomb threat (measures for detecting bombs or explosives are not
included):
Site Design
| Park vehicles away from loading dock areas. |
| Site facilities so that loading dock areas are away from
other facilities or high density population areas. |
| Site facilities as far from other facilities as possible. |
Building Utilization
| Place supplies so they are at least 8 feet from facility
walls to provide a standoff distance between bombs and walls. |
| Place receiving areas away from facility entrances. |
| Locate assets away from receiving areas. |
| Provide a separate facility for handling and receiving
supplies. |
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